This paper reports the results of an experimental test of the Nash equilibrium prediction of voluntary provision of property rights in a contest under anarchy. Specically, the experiment investigates whether pre-commitment induces positive provision of property rights. As pre- dicted, zero...

Consumers’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) for post-harvest processed (PHP) raw oysters – oysters without health risks – is studied in experimental nth-price auction markets. The experimental design decomposes the effects of taste, objective risk information, and information on four PHP...

The failure of foreign aid to promote growth in the developing world has received significant attention as evidence suggests that foreign aid does not translate into investment. This research has demonstrated that poor institutions in these developing economies (particularly with respect to...

This paper derives the conditions under which property rights can arise in an anarchy equilibrium. The creation of property rights requires that players devote part of their endowment to the public good of property rights protection. In the Nash equilibrium, players contribute zero to the...

Consumers’ willingness to pay for postharvest-processed (PHP) raw oysters—oysters without health risks—is studied in experimental auction markets. The experimental design decomposes the effects of taste, objective risk information, and information on four PHP technologies on...

This paper presents an experimental test of a 2-player, one-shot game of conflict in which we vary the strength of property rights and the return on investment. Our results suggest that stronger property rights reduce conflict and increase investment. Contrary to intuition, we find increasing...