This note provides an overview of the rationale and the challenges associated with building new businesses within established companies. It provides a framework for understanding why corporations pursue entrepreneurial ventures and the various levers that they employ. The note offers a...

The theory of mechanism design and implementation abounds with clever mechanisms whose equilibrium outcomes are optimal according to some social choice rule. However, the cleverness of these mechanisms relies on intricate systems of rewards and punishments off-the-equilibrium path. Generally, it...

Can the author always design a game form so that all its Bayesian equilibrium outcomes are either interim individually rational efficient or interim envy-free efficient in asymmetric information economies? The author shows that the answer is no. Given that such games exist in complete...

A firm monopsonistically hires labor from a pool containing both skilled and unskilled workers. The marginal value of a worker depends on the match between the job and the worker's skill level. Unskilled workers can have negative productivity if they are placed in a skilled job. The firm cannot...