Ownership positions in large corporations can be traded on anonymous markets, but professional partnerships and worker cooperatives do not permit members to transfer their positions to outsiders without consent from other insiders. These contrasting policies are explained by adverse selection...

This paper explores a version of the canonical holdup model where agents undertake specific investments prior to their transaction. In this setting, we identify a novel reason for contractual inefficiency. An investing party (here, the seller) may shirk for strategic reasons, in particular,...

The economic theory of optimal punishments states that the expected penalty for a crime ought to be equal (or at least proportional) to the social harm caused by the act. The Criminal Codes in both Canada and the United States allow for criminals to be penalized to a greater degree if they are a...

Permanent economic inequality is unknown among mobile hunter-gatherers, but hereditary class distinctions between elites and commoners exist in some sedentary foraging societies. With the spread of agriculture, such stratification tends to become more pronounced. We develop a model to explain...

I study how the specific details of a micro founded monetary economy affect the determination of government policy. I consider three variants of the Lagos-Wright monetary framework: a benchmark were all markets are competitive; a case which allows for financial intermediaries; and a case with...