In this note we analyze the viability of a commitment strategy when there are errors in communication. We consider an entry deterrence game where with a certain probability the Incumbent's decision is either perfectly observed by the Potential Intruder or, with complementary probability, nothing...

There is robust experimental evidence that some people have selfish preferences, and others have social, or other-regarding, preferences. This paper seeks to explain why there is such preference heterogeneity. In our approach preferences are endogenous to the economy's institutional setup. We...

We analyse the evolutionary stability of a preference for reciprocity in the Prisoner's Dilemma. A distingushing and, as we argue, plausible, feature of the analysis is that reciprocal players are not assumed to be able to coordinate on mutual cooperation with probability one. We show how two...

In recent decades most developed countries have experienced an increase in income inequality. In this paper, we use an equilibrium search framework to shed additional light on what is causing income distribution to change. The major benefit of the model is that it is can accommodate shocks to...

We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of ergodic oscillations and geometric sensitivity in a two-sector model of economic growth with labor augmenting externalities. We transform the Euler equation into a first order backward first order equation. Factor intensity...

This paper studies a two-sector endogenous growth model with <p> labour augmenting externalities or Harrod-Neutral technical change. The <p> technologies are general and the preferences are of the CES class. If con- <p> sumers are su±ciently patient, ergodic chaos and geometric sensitivity to <p> initial...</p></p></p></p>

We develop a two-sector model to analyze which kind of social <p> organization generates trust. Social capital is de…ned as trust. We examine two <p> communities: the bedroom community in which people commute long distance <p> to work and the virility community in which people do not commute to work. <p>...</p></p></p></p>

We study how trust is generated in society. In a two-sector <p> model, we analyze two communities. In the bonding community people do not <p> trust people outside their regular networks. In the bridging community people <p> choose to trust strangers when they meet them. The hypothesis is that when <p> trust...</p></p></p></p>