consider an N-player normal form game played repeatedly in which each player should choose each strategy exactly one time (payoffs are aggregated). such "play only once" situations occur naturally in the context of scheduling. assume that each player has the same number of strategies. Then,...

We consider the situation in which individuals in a finite population must repeatedly choose an action yielding an uncertain payoff. Between choices, each individual may observe the performance of one other individual. We search for rules of behavior with limited memory that increase expected...

We analyze the evolution of behavioral rules for learning how to play a two-armed bandit. Individuals have no information about the underlying pay-off distributions and have limited memory about their own past experience. Instead they must rely on information obtained trough observing the...

The evolutionary selection of outcomes (modelled using the replicator dynamics) in games with costless communication depends crucially on the structural assumptions made on the underlying population. (1) In conflicts between two interacting populations, common interest implies that the set of...

In consectutive rounds, each agent in a finite population chooses an action, is randomly matched, obtains a payoff and then observes the performance of another agent. An agent determines future behavior based on the information she receives from the present round. She chooses among the...