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Learning about compliance under asymmetric information
Arguedas, Carmen; Rousseau, Sandra - Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Faculteit Economie … - 2008
Over time, inspection agencies gather information about firms that cause harmful externalities. This information may … certain circumstances, mimicking, or even the threat of mimicking, might reduce socially harmful activities and thus be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005503854
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Learning about compliance under asymmetric information
Arguedas, Carmen; Rousseau, Sandra - In: Resource and Energy Economics 34 (2012) 1, pp. 55-73
means of a signaling game which incorporates dynamic enforcement and learning. Interestingly, we show that the ongoing …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010740048
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Learning About Compliance Under Asymmetric Information
Arguedas, Carmen; Rousseau, Sandra - 2014
Over time, inspection agencies gather information about firms that cause harmful externalities. This information may … certain circumstances, mimicking, or even the threat of mimicking, might reduce socially harmful activities and thus be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014219814
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'To Promote the General Welfare' - Addressing Political Corruption in America
Owen, Bruce M. - 2016
Systemic (but lawful) political corruption reduces well-being and equity in America. Madisonian democracy is no longer capable of containing such corruption. Proposals currently on the table to stem corruption are unlikely to be effective without undermining foundational rights. This essay...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013004353
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Corruption Dynamics: The Golden Goose Effect
Niehaus, Paul; Sukhtankar, Sandip - In: American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 5 (2013) 4, pp. 230-69
Theoretical work on disciplining corrupt agents has emphasized the role of expected future rents?for example, efficiency wages. Yet taken seriously this approach implies that illicit future rents should also deter corruption. We study this "golden goose" effect in the context of a statutory wage...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010704414
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A perfectly competitive economy is an economy without welfare relevant endogenous learning
Nyborg, Karine - 2021
endogenous welfare relevant learning is feasible, the economy cannot be perfectly competitive unless identical learning choices … information is shared, externalities arise. The standard conditions for the two fundamental welfare theorems, thus, implicitly … preclude heterogeneous welfare relevant learning decisions. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012520083
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A perfectly competitive economy is an economy without welfare relevant endogenous learning
Nyborg, Karine - 2021
endogenous welfare relevant learning is feasible, the economy cannot be perfectly competitive unless identical learning choices … information is shared, externalities arise. The standard conditions for the two fundamental welfare theorems, thus, implicitly … preclude heterogeneous welfare relevant learning decisions. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012875989
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Intra-firm bargaining and learning in a market equilibrium
Drugov, Mikhail - Departamento de Economía, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - 2011
This paper introduces an agency relationship into a dynamic game with informational externalities. Two principals …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008861885
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The impact of judicial objective function on the enforcement of environmental standards.
BLONDIAU, Thomas; ROUSSEAU, Sandra - Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Faculteit Economie … - 2009
We investigate the influence of a judge’s objective function on the type of sanctions used for enforcing environmental standards. We focus on the difference between monetary and non-monetary penalties. Therefore, we examine the extent to which judges take social costs of sanctions into account...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008630056
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Monitoring and enforcement of environmental regulations
Telle, Kjetil - In: Journal of Public Economics 99 (2013) C, pp. 24-34
Relying on a small natural field experiment conducted by the Norwegian Environmental Protection Agency, I estimate effects of three fundamental elements of most monitoring and enforcement practices: self-reporting, audit frequency and specific deterrence. I find evidence of under-reporting of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010617198