Over time, inspection agencies gather information about firms that cause harmful externalities. This information may … certain circumstances, mimicking, or even the threat of mimicking, might reduce socially harmful activities and thus be …

means of a signaling game which incorporates dynamic enforcement and learning. Interestingly, we show that the ongoing …

Over time, inspection agencies gather information about firms that cause harmful externalities. This information may … certain circumstances, mimicking, or even the threat of mimicking, might reduce socially harmful activities and thus be …

endogenous welfare relevant learning is feasible, the economy cannot be perfectly competitive unless identical learning choices … information is shared, externalities arise. The standard conditions for the two fundamental welfare theorems, thus, implicitly … preclude heterogeneous welfare relevant learning decisions. …

endogenous welfare relevant learning is feasible, the economy cannot be perfectly competitive unless identical learning choices … information is shared, externalities arise. The standard conditions for the two fundamental welfare theorems, thus, implicitly … preclude heterogeneous welfare relevant learning decisions. …

This paper introduces an agency relationship into a dynamic game with informational externalities. Two principals …

cause agents to aggregate information through social/observational learning; second, it will decrease the network …