De nombreux travaux en économie industrielle et écologie des organisations s’intéressent de manière récente au lien entre l’âge de l’organisation et sa probabilité de disparition. Testant quatre propositions théoriques relatives à la relation entre âge et mortalité, nous...

This paper investigates the foundations of cooperative identity and how it is constructed by the organisation. More specifically, our research focuses on a financial cooperative in the simultaneously emerging and consolidating cultural sector. The originality of this paper lies in the...

Les pôles de compétitivité, basés sur le modèle des clusters, sont au coeur de la nouvelle politique industrielle française. Ils ont pour objet de favoriser un environnement propice à l'innovation à fort potentiel technologique, moteur de croissance économique. L'objectif de ce papier...

Are labels good or bad for consumers and firms? The answers may seem straightforward since labels improve information, yet economic theory reveals situations where their introduction reduces the welfare of, at least, some market participants. This essay reviews the theoretical literature on...

In this note, we extend the Goyal and Joshi's model of network of collaboration in oligopoly to multi-market situations. We examine the incentive of firms to form links and the architectures of the resulting equilibrium networks of this setting. We also present some results on efficient networks.

Contractual inefficiencies within supply chains increase an input price above its marginal cost, therefore they are considered detrimental to consumer surplus. We argue that such inefficiencies may be beneficial to consumers in quality-differentiated markets. Indeed, enhancing contractual...

We report the results of an original experiment that was designed to test the strength and robustness of the attraction effect. Rather than the usual simple tests for this effect, we consider a conceptually simple consumer purchasing task where alternatives are however difficult to evaluate. For...

Social networks, be it on the internet or in real life, facilitate information flows. We model this by giving agents incentives to link with others and receive information through those links. We consider networks where agents have an incentive to confirm the information they receive from...

In this paper we show that, in the presence of buyer and seller power, a monopolist can enter into a costly contractual relationship with a low-quality supplier with the sole intention of improving its bargaining position relative to a high-quality supplier, without ever selling the good...