This paper describes a laboratory experiment design that has been developed to assess a new political economy institution for possible use in trade negotiations. The objective of this paper is to explain the implementation of this experimental design in the context of a "horizontal" model of a...

We employ an empirical general equilibrium model of the CAP to determine which factors and countries would be expected to be opposed to or support reform of the CAP. The objective is to determine who the "friends" and "enemies" of the CAP are. The analysis studies the extent to which lobbying...

The political science literature has long been concerned with the behavioral properties of alternative bargaining institutions. The focus of most of this research has been on the way in which committees make decisions, but there has been some interest in legislative and electoral processes. From...

Is it possible to design a bargaining institution that will substantially improve the international trade negotiations conducted in a multilateral basis? Rausser and Simon [1991] propose a multilateral bargaining (MB) institution which has many attractive theoretical properties, and which...

In a companion series of papers, we have described a new bargaining institution and the design of laboratory experiments to assess its performance (see Rausser and Simon [1991] and Harrison and Simon [1991]). In this paper we describe and evaluate the first series of pilot experiments. In...

This paper describes the basic laboratory experiment design that has been developed to assess a new Multilateral Bargaining institution that may be used for trade negotiations. Our overall objective is to implement a series of laboratory experiments that tests the ability of this institutions to...

We employ a numerical equilibrium model to evaluate the payoffs to agricultural and non-agricultural interests in the EC and the US. A government objective function for each region is calibrated as a weighted sum of the payoffs to the two interest groups with weights corresponding to the...

We design an experiment to test the hypothesis that, in violation of Bayes Rule, some people respond more forcefully to the strength of information than to its weight. We provide incentives to motivate effort, use naturally occurring information, and control for risk attitude. We find that the...

We characterize the literacy of an individual in a domain by their elicited subjective belief distribution over the possible responses to a question posed in that domain. By eliciting the distribution, rather than just the answers to true/false or multiple choice questions, we can directly...

We propose the use of Bayesian estimation of risk preferences of individuals for applications of behavioral welfare economics to evaluate observed choices that involve risk. Bayesian estimation provides more systematic control of the use of informative priors over inferences about risk...