We study the conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource game. We consider three types of agents: cooperators, defectors and enforcers. The role of enforcers is to punish defectors for overharvesting the resource. Agents are located around a circle and they only...

Conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource game are studied. This combines in a unique way local and global interactions. A fixed number of harvesters are located on a spatial grid. Harvesters choose among three strategies: defection, cooperation, and...

Conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource game are studied. This combines in a unique way local and global interactions. A fixed number of harvesters are located on a spatial grid. Harvesters choose among three strategies: defection, cooperation, and...

We study the conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource game. We consider three types of agents: cooperators, defectors and enforcers. The role of enforcers is to punish defectors for overharvesting the resource. Agents are located around a circle and they only...

This study offers a unique evolutionary economics perspective on energy and innovation policies in the wider context of the transition to sustainable development.

Recent advances in evolutionary theory have important implications for environmental economics. A short overview is offered of evolutionarythinking in economics. Subsequently, major concepts and approaches inevolutionary biology and evolutionary economics are presented andcompared. Attention is...

A model framework, SIMBIOSES, is presented which describes economic activities and relatedmaterial, substance and energy flows in a multi-region and multi-sector economic system. Theconceptual design of the framework is discussed in relation to current issues on "dematerialization"and...