Previous experimental results on one-shot sequential two-player games show that group de- cisions are closer to the subgame-perfect Nash equilbirum than individual decisions. We extend the analysis of inter-group versus inter-individual decision making to a Stackelberg market game, by running...

We elicit time preferences of a representative sample of 1,102 Dutch individuals and also confront them with a series of incentivized investment decisions. There are two treatments which di¤er by the frequency at which individuals decide about the invested amount. The low frequency treatment...

We model the structure of a firm or an organization as a network and consider minimum-effort games played on this network as a metaphor for cooperations failing due to coordination failures. For a family of behavioral rules, including Imitate the Best and the Proportional Imitation Rule, we show...

We let consumers vote on tax regimes in experimental markets. We test if taxes on sellers are more popular than taxes on consumers, i.e. on voters themselves, even if taxes on sellers are inefficiently high. Taxes on sellers are more popular if voters underestimate the extent of tax shifting in...

Many studies of the determinants of investment use Tobin’s T to control for the investment opportunities of a firm. Tobin’s T roughly measures the average return on a firm’s capital anticipated by the market. More relevant for investment decisions, however, is the marginal return on...

We look at a simple market with two-sided heterogeneity and pairwise meetings. On the supply side are two landlord types who differ in the quality of their apartments. On the demand side is a continuum of tentant types who differ in their valuations for apartment types and their patience. For...

We consider a model where exporting requires finding a local partner in each market. Contracts are incomplete and exporters must learn the reliability of their partners through experience. In the model, export behavior is state-dependent due to matching frictions, although there are no sunk...

This paper investigates the eectiveness of immigration control policies when the duration of stay of illegal immigrants is endogenous because they may return home voluntarily. It shows that return intentions matter. First, we nd that spending on border enforcement can potentially increase the...

Incentivized methods for eliciting subjective probabilities in economic experiments present the subject with risky choices or bets that encourage truthful reporting. We discuss the most prominent elicitation methods and their underlying assumptions, provide theoretical comparisons, and propose...

The unraveling argument says that when a rm may produce dierent qualities and quality is unknown to consumers, the rm has an incentive to disclose the private information as in any pool of rms there is a best quality rm and this rm has an incentive to disclose. Recent literature has established...