Immigration policies are generally protectionist, yet positive immigration quotas often exist for workers in specic occupations where the native labor supply is scarce. This paper determines occupation-specic immigration quotas in a political economy framework with endogenous prices and compares...

We consider quasi-orderings of infinite utility streams satisfying the strong Pareto axiom (i.e., Paretian quasi-orderings) and study the question of how strong a notion of intergenerational equity one can impose on these quasi-orderings without generating an impossibility theorem. Building on a...

The present note revisits a result by Kim and Wong (2010) showing that any strict Nash equilibrium of a coordination game can be supported as a long run equilibrium by properly adding dominated strategies. We show that in the circular city model of local interactions the selection of 1/2...

Many studies of the determinants of investment use Tobin’s T to control for the investment opportunities of a firm. Tobin’s T roughly measures the average return on a firm’s capital anticipated by the market. More relevant for investment decisions, however, is the marginal return on...

We look at a simple market with two-sided heterogeneity and pairwise meetings. On the supply side are two landlord types who differ in the quality of their apartments. On the demand side is a continuum of tentant types who differ in their valuations for apartment types and their patience. For...

This paper develops a model to analyze the effects of immigration by skill on the outcome of a majority vote among natives on both the size as well as the composition of public spending. Public spending can be of two types, spending on rival goods (transfers) and on non-rival goods (public...

We model the structure of a firm or an organization as a network and consider minimum-effort games played on this network as a metaphor for cooperations failing due to coordination failures. For a family of behavioral rules, including Imitate the Best and the Proportional Imitation Rule, we show...

We let consumers vote on tax regimes in experimental markets. We test if taxes on sellers are more popular than taxes on consumers, i.e. on voters themselves, even if taxes on sellers are inefficiently high. Taxes on sellers are more popular if voters underestimate the extent of tax shifting in...

We look at a simple market with two-sided heterogeneity and pairwise meetings. On the supply side are two landlord types who differ in the quality of their apartments. On the demand side is a continuum of tentant types who differ in their valuations for apartment types and their patience. For...