Missing data is a major problem in empirical development economics, as it may entail efficiency losses as well as biased results. This is an issue within the literature that investigates the effect of foreign aid on welfare. Using multiple imputation techniques, we address these problems and...

This paper presents a generalised framework to understand mixed-strategy sales behaviour with informative advertising. By introducing competition in the utility space into a clearinghouse sales model, we oer a highly tractable framework that can i) provide a novel welfare analysis of...

Mispricing (the dierence between prices and their underlying fundamental values) is an important characteristic of markets. The literature on the topic consists of many dierent measures. This state of aairs is unsatisfactory, since dierent measures may produce dierent results. Stockl et al....

Immigration policies are generally protectionist, yet positive immigration quotas often exist for workers in specic occupations where the native labor supply is scarce. This paper determines occupation-specic immigration quotas in a political economy framework with endogenous prices and compares...

We present methods of belief elicitation which are applicable for any non-trivial utility function. Unlike existing techniques that account for deviations from risk-neutrality, these methods are highly transparent to sub- jects. Rather than identifying beliefs exactly we identify bounds on...

Although (or because) it is uncommon to observe consumers bargaining at retail stores in the Western world, the circumstances under which retail rms are actually willing to bargain is largely unknown. We construct a theoretical model in order to better understand how price and rm characteristics...

We consider a discrete-time dynamic game in which a nite number of players extract a non-renewable resource and derive consumption solely from the extracted amount (cake-eating game). Markov-perfect Nash equilibria can be constructed in this game not only if the players have time-preference...

We explore in an equilibrium framework whether games with multiple Nash equilibria are easier to play when players can communicate. We consider two variants, modelling talk about future plans and talk about past actions. The language from which messages are chosen is endogenous, messages are...

We consider situations in which a principal tries to induce an agent to spend e®ort on accumulating a state variable that a®ects the well-being of both parties. The only incentive mechanism that the principal can use is a state-dependent transfer of her own utility to the agent. Formally, the...

The present article extends a variant of the Obstfeld/Rogoff (2001) two-country DSGE model by introducing Calvo (1983) pricing. It is possible to collapse the model into a canonical log-linear representation consisting of two dynamic IS and two New Keynesian Phillips curves. Re°ecting the...