Creditors often share information about their customers' credit record. Besides helping them to spot bad risks, this informational exchange acts as a disciplinary device. If creditors are known to exchange data about defaults, borrowers must consider that default on a current lender would...

In this paper we develop a theory of union bargaining power based on firm specific skills acquired by the insider workforce.

In this paper we develop a theory of union power based on the aggregation of bargaining power of individual workers with firm specific skills. Union power depends on the ease of replacement from internal and external labor markets. Unions increase the bargaining power of insiders only in states...

We develop a model of financially distressed firm to analyze the implications of a bank debt restructuring when the operational characteristics of the firm's project for the post-distress period are endogenously determined as part of the workout.

In this paper we develop a game-theoretic version of the "right-to-manage" model of firm-level bargaining where strategic interactions among firms are explicitly recognized. Our main aim is to investigate how equilibrium wages and employment react to changes in various labor and product market...