We report an experiment comparing sequential and simultaneous contributions to a public good in a quasi-linear two … unwillingness to reward first movers who contribute. …

We report an experiment comparing sequential and simultaneous contributions to a public good in a quasi-linear two …-person setting (Varian, Journal of Public Economics, 1994). Our findings support the theoretical argument that sequential … best response. This induces early contributors to contribute more than they otherwise would. A consequence of this is that …

In this paper we examine voluntary contributions to a public good when the timing of contributions is endogenously … is predicted to emerge in their "action commitment" extended game. We then report a laboratory experiment designed to … opportunities may be less damaging to public good provision than previously thought. …

We report an experiment comparing sequential and simultaneous contributions to a public good in a quasi-linear two …-person setting (Varian, Journal of Public Economics, 1994). Our findings support the theoretical argument that sequential … best response. This induces early contributors to contribute more than they otherwise would. A consequence of this is that …

In this paper we examine voluntary contributions to a public good, embedding Varian (1994)’s voluntary contribution … report a laboratory experiment based on these extended games. We find that behavior is similar in the two extended games …: subjects avoid the detrimental move order of Varian’s model, where a person with a high value of the public good commits to a …

We analysed dyads strategies in one-shot public goods game. By means of a laboratory experiment, using a variant of the …

The formation of social ties is examined in an experimental study of voluntary public good provision. The experiment … part couples play 25 periods of a public good game. In the third part the attitudes of subjects to their partners in the … public good game is measured. The concept of a social tie is operationalized as the difference between the measurements in …

controlled conditions, we have conducted a public goods experiment with central punishment. The authority is neutral - she does … not benefit from contributions to the public good. Punishment is costly. Along with the punishment decisions the authority … authorityś decision affecting herself, not affecting others. In the Public treatment, all reasons are made public. Whenever …

which every player wants to contribute to the public good provided enough other players contribute, and a prisoners’ dilemma …In some important multi-player situations, such as efforts to supply a global public good, players can choose the game …