Centralized sanctioning institutions are of utmost importance for overcoming free-riding tendencies and enforcing … outcomes that maximize group welfare in social dilemma situations. However, little is known about how such institutions come … institutions in a public goods game. Our theoretical analysis shows that players may form sanctioning institutions in equilibrium …

Centralized sanctioning institutions are of utmost importance for overcoming free-riding tendencies and enforcing … outcomes that maximize group welfare in social dilemma situations. However, little is known about how such institutions come … institutions in a public goods game. Our theoretical analysis shows that players may form sanctioning institutions in equilibrium …

Centralized sanctioning institutions are of utmost importance for overcoming free-riding tendencies and enforcing … outcomes that maximize group welfare in social dilemma situations. However, little is known about how such institutions come … institutions in a public goods game. Our theoretical analysis shows that players may form sanctioning institutions in equilibrium …

This paper examines the voluntary formation of centralized sanctioning institutions. We introduce a simple model to … study institution formation as a second-order cooperation problem where voluntary contributions to a common fund serve as an … instrument to finance centralized sanctioning institutions. Our model illustrates how self-interested motivations may lead to the …

The provision of public goods often relies on voluntary contributions and cooperation. While most of the experimental … literature focuses on individual contributions, many real-world problems involve the formation of institutions among subgroups … coalitions in different institutions and compares those to a voluntary contribution mechanism. The experiment confirms the rather …

The provision of public goods often relies on voluntary contributions and cooperation. While most of the experimental … literature focuses on individual contributions, many real-world problems involve the formation of institutions among subgroups … coalitions in different institutions and compares those to a voluntary contribution mechanism. The experiment confirms the rather …

exist in work teams. Our results show that the introduction of a team allocator leads to pronounced cooperation in both …