In a dynamic general equilibrium model, we derive conditions for a mutual fund separation property by which the savings decision is separated from the asset allocation decision. With logarithmic utility functions, this separation holds for any heterogeneity in discount factors, while the...

This paper investigates the effectiveness of two instruments designed to defer termination in the centipede game: an insurance against termination by the opponent, and an option to offer the opponent a bonus for not terminating the game. The rational prediction in both cases is passing until...

A one-dimensional model of spatial political competition with endogenous party formation is developed. It is proved that at equilibrium there are only two parties. These parties propose alternatives in the extreme positions of the policy space. The adopted policy, however, is a compromise...

This paper argues that observations of non-stationary choice behavior need not necessarily imply specific properties of the individual’s discount function. As we show, the observed “anomalies” in intertemporal choice can alternatively be explained by an individual’s perception of the...

Authors who consider efficient bargaining on the labor market predominantly focus on the Nash-bargaining solution. It seems, however, that actual labor market negotiations between an employers’ federation and a labor union are often characterized by mutual concessions, which may be accounted...

This paper proposes a simple two-stage mechanism to establish positive contributions to public goods in the absence of powerful institutions to provide the public good and to sanction free-riders. In this mechanism players commit to the public good by paying a deposit prior to the contribution...