This paper studies geometric properties of semi-algebraic economies with (eventually nonconvex) production - a class which includes linear or Cobb-Douglas preferences, polyhedric production sets and indivisible commodities as well. The main departure with the textbook differentiable viewpoint is...

Dans les modeles d'oligopoles successifs, les firmes integrees se trouvent dans une situation particuliere, puisqu'elles realisent leurs profits a la fois sur le marche intermediaire et sur le marche final. En tant que firmes amont, en particulier, elles ont une incitation a offrir moins de bien...

We investigate properties of correlated equilibria in competitive, pure-exchange market games. We prove that: 1) the game defined in Schmeidler (1980) always admits the no-trade issue as mixed equilibrium outcome; 2) non-pure correlated equilibria may exist in every competitive strategic market...

This paper develops a two-sector overlapping generations model in which one sector produces an externality on the environmental quality and the other has no effect. We assume that environmental quality degradation results from production activity of one sector. Then, we characterize the...

This paper constructs two feasible strategic market games associated to an economy with infinite-dimensional trade space, finitely many traders, and finitely many firms, such that the set of outcomes induced by pure Nash equilibria coincides with the set of competitive equilibria. In both games,...

In a previous paper, Abouda and Chateauneuf proved that for RDEU maximizing MM with non-increasing marginal utility, positivity of the bid-ask spread can be identified with a very weak form of risk aversion SMRA. We perform here a more thorough study of SMRA, firstly in a general setting, and...

In this paper, we study the intertemporal equilibria of an infinite-lived representative agent model with public debt. We show that for a given path of government expenditures, there generally exist a continuum of equilibria depending on various debt policies.