This paper introduces a novel method for examining the effects of vertical integration. The basic idea is to estimate the parameters of a vertical entry game. By carefully specifying firms' payoff equations and constructing appropriate tests, it is possible to use estimates on rival profit...

Manufacturers often engage in practices that impede consumer search. Examples include proliferating product varieties, imposing vertical informational restraints, and banning online sales to make it more difficult for consumers to compare prices. This paper models vertical bargaining over...

A manufacturer chooses the optimal retail market structure and bilaterally and secretly contracts with each (homogeneous) retailer. In a classic framework without asymmetric information, the manufacturer sells through a single exclusive retailer in order to eliminate the opportunism problem....

We analyze the competitive effects of backward vertical integration in a model with oligopolistic firms that exert market power upstream and downstream. In contrast to previous literature, we show that a small degree of vertical integration is always procompetitive because efficiency effects...

This article develops an analytical framework that can be used to assess competition in South African telecommunications and, thereafter, applies this framework in an evaluation of vertical integration patterns in the telecommunications industry. It is shown that, despite recent regulatory...

The paper redefines different types of vertical market structure, such as double monopoly, bilateral monopoly, and two-sided monopoly. The core issue can be stated as follows: When there is bilateral monopoly, what are the differences between two-sided monopoly and one-sided monopoly as far as...

This paper measures the impact of vertically integrated and exclusive software on industry structure and welfare in the sixth-generation of the U.S. videogame industry (2000-2005). I specify and estimate a dynamic model of both consumer demand for hardware and software products, and software...

We analyze the competitive effects of backward vertical integration when firms exert market power upstream and compete à la Cournot downstream. Contrasting with previous literature, a small degree of vertical integration is always procompetitive because efficiency gains dominate foreclosure...

In this paper we consider a market situation in which initially there is an unintegrated monopoly upstream that owns an essential facility and two dowstream firms. Then the market is liberalized allowing upstream entry and vertical integration. The equilibrium entry mode - sharing the incumbent...

This paper argues that the balance of power between producers and retailers depends on the relative degrees of differentiation at the two levels of the vertical structure. The authors propose an extension of Hotelling's model in which two producers, competing in prices with horizontally...