In a world where firms are oligopolists, is it possible to create a customs union that raises the welfare of member countries without hurting non-members countries? We give sufficient conditions for an affirmative answer.

This paper studies the optimal production subsidies for domestic firms that compete in an export market against each other as well as against foreign rivals. Assuming that all firms do not have identical cost curves, it shows that the optimal policy for the home government is to give the more...

We consider the effects of export restraints on price competition in the Hotelling model of horizontal product differentiation. We characterise the Nash equilibrium for all possible values of the quota and compare our results with those of Krishna. We show that a foreign producer would choose a...

We consider the two-stage game proposed by Kreps and Scheinkman in the adress model of horizontal differenciation developed by Hotelling. Firms choose capacities in the first stage and then compete in price. We show that capacity precommitment softens price competitio drastically.

Although the world and its global economy become more and more integrated with each passing year, not all the correlated increase in trade could be unambiguously be called free trade. A significant share of world trade growth in the past generation has occured with state guided economies of...

We show that the Kemp-Wan proposition concerning the formation of customs union holds conditions of iperfect competition and increasing returns.

We show that the Kemp-Wan proposition concerning the formation of customs union holds under conditions of imperfect competition and increasing returns.