L’objet de cet article est d’examiner, à la lumière de deux solutions majeures de la théorie des jeux coopératifs, les coalitions/négociations électorales qui ont lieu dans le cas où le mode de scrutin est un scrutin proportionnel avec listes bloquées, prime au gagnant et comportant...

Nous exploitons dans cet article la théeorie des indices de pouvoir pour éevaluer les infuences respectives des deux classes d’électeurs dans le mode de scrutin instauré par la loi électorale du 29 juin 1820, dite loi du \double vote". Nous montrons, à l’aide d’un modèle simplifié,...

We study how career concerns affect the dynamics of incentives in a multi-period contract, when the agent’s productivity can evolve exogenously (random shocks) or improve endogenously through investment. We show that incentives are stronger and performance is higher when the contract...

We study the role of status in an experimental Principal-Agent game.Status is awarded to subjects based on either talent or luck. In each randomly matched principal-agent pair, the principal chooses the agent's status-contingent piece rate for a task in which talent matters for performance (an...

EU regulation on quality food products (PDO labeling) is expected to sustain competitiveness within the agricultural sector. This paper examines the impact of this policy on the survival of cheese firms over the period 1990-2006 in France. We show that such a policy (Ap- pellation d'Origine...

We develop an agency model of organized crime accounting for the main trade-offs involved by the introduction of an accomplice-witness program. We characterize the optimal policy and identify its main determinants in a framework where public officials can be dishonest. Our predictions are tested...

This paper presents a model of provocation in a federation, where the local government triggers an insurgency with a view to acquire the control of some economic assets with the help of the central government. Some econometric support for this model is found using data on the Naxalite conflict...

This paper addresses the issue of price signaling in a model of vertical relationship between a manufacturer and a retailer who share the same information about quality, unlike consumers who do not observe it a priori. We show that delegating the price setting task to a retailer and controlling...

We show that once interfamily exchanges are considered, Becker?s rotten kids mechan- ism has some remarkable implications that have gone hitherto unnoticed. Specifically, we establish that Cornes and Silva's (1999) result of e¢fficiency in the contribution game amongst siblings extends to a...

This paper examines whether myopia (misperception of the long-term care (LTC) risk) and private insurance market loading costs can justify social LTC insurance and/or the subsidization of private insurance. We use a two-period model wherein individuals di¤er in three unobservable...