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Conditional cooperation and the marginal per capita return in public good games

Cartwright, Edward J.; Lovett, Denise - In: Games 5 (2014) 4, pp. 234-256

We investigate experimentally whether the extent of conditional cooperation in public good games depends on the marginal per capita return (MPCR) to the public good and type of game. The MPCR is varied from 0.2 to 0.4 to 0.8. The "standard" game, in which three players contribute before a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709837

Conditional Cooperation and the Marginal per Capita Return in Public Good Games

Cartwright, Edward J.; Lovett, Denise - In: Games 5 (2014) 4, pp. 234-256

We investigate experimentally whether the extent of conditional cooperation in public good games depends on the marginal per capita return (MPCR) to the public good and type of game. The MPCR is varied from 0.2 to 0.4 to 0.8. The ‘standard’ game, in which three players contribute before a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010970523

Leadership and conditional cooperation in public good games: What difference does the game make?

Cartwright, Edward J; Lovett, Denise - School of Economics, University of Kent - 2013

We investigate experimentally whether the extent of conditional cooperation in public good games depends on the marginal return to the public good and type of game. The marginal return is varied from 0.2 to 0.4 to 0.8. The 'standard' game, in which three players contribute before a follower, is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010859420

Those Outsiders: How Downstream Externalities Affect Public Good Provision

Jacobson, Sarah; Delaney, Jason - Economics Department, Williams College - 2013

for in-group members may counteract this effect. We test this model with a lab experiment. With homogeneous in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011271636

The Good of the Few: Reciprocal Acts and the Provision of a Public Bad

Jacobson, Sarah; Delaney, Jason J. - Economics Department, Williams College - 2012

lever for reciprocity: if someone contributes when another is Stakeholder, he may be rewarded with a gift when he becomes … Stakeholder. Reciprocity is only possible when agents know others' roles and actions, so information provision may be pro- or anti …-social. In a laboratory experiment, we combine a rotating or alternating asymmetry in payoffs with varying levels of information …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011271640

A Trace of Anger is Enough: On the Enforcement of Social Norms

Steiner, Jakub - Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and … - 2005

It is well documented that the possibility of punishing free-riders increases contributions in one-shot public good games. I demonstrate theoretically that minimal punishment commitments (perhaps provided by anger) may lead to high contribution levels. Thus, almost selfish players may behave as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005357513

The Good of the Few: Reciprocity in the Provision of a Public Bad

Jacobson, Sarah; Delaney, Jason - Economics Department, Williams College - 2012

hopes of being rewarded later with a reciprocal gift. In a lab experiment, we find evidence of such favor trading. We also … othersÂ’ actions and roles has previously been shown to enable efficiency-increasing reciprocity, we show that it also enables …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009395801

Those outsiders: How downstream externalities affect public good provision

Delaney, Jason; Jacobson, Sarah - In: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 67 (2014) 3, pp. 340-352

or a preference for in-group members may counteract this. We test this model with a lab experiment using Outsiders with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011043096

Can Charitable Appeals Identify and Exploit Belief Heterogeneity?

Drouvelis, Michalis; Marx, Benjamin M. - 2021

Charitable fundraisers frequently announce giving by others, and research shows that this can increase donations. However, this mechanism may not put information about peers to the most efficient use if it is costly to inform individuals who are indifferent to peer actions or causes some...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012493001

Experiments in economics : playing fair with money

Chaudhuri, Ananish - 2009 - 1. publ.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003725806