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The Viability of Cooperation Based on Interpersonal Commitment

Back, István; Flache, Andreas - In: Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 9 (2006) 1, pp. 12-12

A prominent explanation of cooperation in repeated exchange is reciprocity (e.g. Axelrod, 1984). However, empirical … successful strategy than reciprocity. We move beyond previous computational models by proposing a method that allows to … experiments designed to assess the viability of commitment against a large set of potential competitors. In the first experiment …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005518570

The Behavioural Dimensions of International Cooperation

Messner, Dirk; Guarín, Alejandro; Haun, Daniel - 2013

that there are seven basic mechanisms that determine whether or not cooperation is successful or sustainable: reciprocity …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012172029

Social ties in a public good experiment

Dijk, Frans van; Sonnemans, Joep; Winden, Frans A. A. M. van - 2000

The formation of social ties is examined in an experimental study of voluntary public good provision. The experimental design consists of three parts. In the first part the value orientation (attitude to a generalized other) is measured. In the second part couples play a multi-period public good...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781548

Contributing for myself, but free riding for my group?

Iida, Yoshio; Schwieren, Christiane - In: German economic review 17 (2016) 1, pp. 36-47

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011473947

Ostracism in alliances of teams and individuals : voting, exclusion, contribution, and earnings

Huber, Stephan; Model, Jochen; Städter, Silvio - 2019

Alliances often provide a collective good among their allies. This article offers laboratory experimental evidence that the possibility to vote for the exclusion of non-cooperating allies, i.e. ostracism, can be a powerful negative referendum to increase allies’ contributions to the collective...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011978897

Nudging cooperation

Barron, Kai; Nurminen, Tuomas - 2018

This paper experimentally studies two simple interventions aimed at increasing public goods provision in settings in which accurate feedback about contributions is not available. The first intervention aims to exploit lying aversion by requiring subjects to send a non-verifiable ex post...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011982104

Bayesian Nash equilibria with a provision point : an experimental test

Johnson, Lowell R. - 1997

This paper extends theory and experimentation in the context of two parties in a group who contribute to a public good with a provision point. This study analyzes the voluntary contributions game in which a public good is provided if and only if the sum of contributions meets or exceeds a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011577030

Designing institutions for social dilemmas

Rockenbach, Bettina; Wolff, Irenaeus - In: German economic review 17 (2016) 3, pp. 316-336

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011665735

Tipping versus cooperating to supply a public good

Barrett, Scott; Dannenberg, Astrid - 2015

In some important multi-player situations, such as efforts to supply a global public good, players can choose the game they want to play. In this paper we conduct an experimental test of the decision to choose between a “tipping” game, in which every player wants to contribute to the public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010496893

The design of (de)centralized punishment institutions for sustaining co-operation

Kosfeld, Michael; Riedl, Arno - 2004

This discussion paper has resulted in the publication (2007) 'Order without law? Experimental evidence on voluntary cooperation and sanctioning', 2007, KritV - Kritische Vierteljahresschrift fur Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft, 90, 1-2, 140-155.In this paper we discuss experimental evidence...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334839