Mixed-motive noncooperative games feature ambivalence in the competitive relation of the players and outcomes disobliging Nash equilibrium prescription. The Nash approach, ostensibly rational and self-maximizing, regularly advises strategy many players regard as counterintuitive or faulty. And...

Consider agents who undertake costly effort to produce stochastic outputs observable by a principal. The principal can award a prize deterministically to the agent with the highest output, or to all of them with probabilities that are proportional to their outputs. We show that, if there is...

We introduce the novel concept of a three-dimensional payoff matrix based on a simplified version of a card game. This matrix is necessary to represent the three variables which correspond to the dynamics of the game. We find Sonnaville-Mensink Equilibria (SME) that represent the optimal actions...

Does inequality hinder or promote cooperation? To answer this question, we study a Prisoner’s Dilemma with local adaptation, to which we add heterogeneity in payoffs. In our model, agents vary in their wealth, and this inequality affects their potential gains and losses. We find that, in such...

This paper models the coalition formation process among primates as a sequential game. The population consists of primates having distinct social ranks. The rank of each individual is determined by his resource holding potential. Each member of the population is interested in gaining access to a...

Italian Abstract: Come è stata modellata la pubblicità in economia? Essenzialmente la pubblicità è un modo di espandere la domanda. Nel caso di differenziazione orizzontale, la pubblicità può differenziare artificialmente un bene altrimenti omogeneo (pubblicità persuasiva) o rendere...

Consider the following "informational robustness" question: what can we say about the set of outcomes that may arise in equilibrium of a Bayesian game if players may observe some additional information? This set of outcomes will correspond to a solution concept that is weaker than equilibrium,...

We propose an incomplete information analogue of rationalizability. An action is said to be belief-free rationalizable if it survives the following iterated deletion process. At each stage, we delete actions for a type of a player that are not a best response to some conjecture that puts weight...

Recently a variety of link-based stability concepts have emerged in the literature on game theoretic models of social network formation. We investigate two basic formation properties that establish equivalence between some well known types of stable networks and their natural extensions. These...

Using language game notions and the equivalence between games, this document studies John Nash's decision of not playing the coalitional game proposed by John von Neumann. The key point is that Nash suggested hypothetical worlds that are incompatible with the kind proposed by von Neumann. And,...