In this paper, we develop a theory of union bargaining power based on firm specific skills acquired by the insider workforce. We show that unions increase the bargaining power of insiders only in states of the world in which the firm would like to retain insiders but not hire outsiders.

In this paper we develop a theory of union bargaining power based on firm specific skills acquired by the insider workforce.

We develop a model of financially distressed firm to analyze the implications of a bank debt restructuring when the operational characteristics of the firm's project for the post-distress period are endogenously determined as part of the workout.

Creditors often share information about their customers' credit record. Besides helping them to spot bad risks, this informational exchange acts as a disciplinary device. If creditors are known to exchange data about defaults, borrowers must consider that default on a current lender would...

In this paper we analyse the role of asymmetric information between firms and consumers about market conditions.