With fast-track authority (FTA), the US Congress delegates trade-policy authority to the President by committing not to amend a trade agreement. We suggest an interpretation in which Congress uses FTA to forestall destructive competition between its members for protectionist rents. We show that...

In democracies, trade policy is the result of interactions among many agents with different agendas. In accordance with this observation, we construct a dynamic model of legislative trade policy-making in the realm of distributive politics. An economy consists of different sectors, each of which...

We study the impact of child labor standards in Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) on a variety of child labor market outcomes, including employment, education, and household inequality. We develop a stylized general equilibrium model of child labor in an economy open to international trade and...

This paper studies the dynamics of trade reorientation experienced when a country joins a regional trade bloc. We find that the joining country's trade orientation toward bloc countries typically rises along an 'S'-shaped path. We estimate the size, speed, and timing of this adjustment path for...

This paper studies the impact of child labor standards in regional trade agreements on a variety of child labor market outcomes, including employment, education, and household inequality. It develops a stylized general equilibrium model of child labor in an economy open to international trade...

Historically, the trade research field has usually ignored dynamic adjustment of workers, but a recent wave of work has developed a rich set of theoretical and empirical tools to analyze this factor. Empirical approaches have ranged from reduced-form regressions to the structural estimation of...

This survey reviews research on how workers and labor markets respond to trade shocks, with an emphasis on recent and ongoing work and on dynamic rather than static analysis. Some studies estimate rich models of worker behavior, while others simplify the worker's problem to embed it in a rich...

We ask how globalization affects a government's incentives to set labor standards for its workers. In a stylized equilibrium model of global value chains, we find two contrasting results. First, each country chooses stricter labor standards with globalization than it would under autarky, because...

In a stylized model of multinational firms choosing host locations for their global value chains, host-country governments choose the strength of collective-bargaining rights that allow their workers to receive a share of the resulting quasi-rents. Each government must trade off the direct...

With fast-track authority (FTA), the US Congress delegates trade-policy authority to the President by committing not to amend a trade agreement. We suggest an interpretation in which Congress uses FTA to forestall destructive competition between its members for protectionist rents. We show that...