November 9, 1995 (First version: July 1994) <p>This paper views uncertainty and economic fluctuations as being primarily endogenous and internally propagated phenomena. The most important Endogenous Uncertainty examined in this paper is price uncertainty which arises when agents do not have...</p>

May 1999 <p> This paper has been prepared under the EC TSER Programme's TIPIK Project, for presentation to the 3 rd TIPIK Workshop held in Strasbourg, at BETA, University of Louis Pasteur, 24 th April 1999. We are grateful for the comments and suggestions received from colleagues in the TIPIK...</p>

October 2000 <p> Reductions in international interest rates are a major cause of capital flows to emerging economies. Increases in domestic interest rates are a frequent policy response to the resulting price increases. This is often unsuccessful. The paper suggests a theoretical explanation based...</p>

March 2001 <p> This paper revisits Akerlof's (1970) classic adverse selection market and asks the following question: do greater information asymmetries reduce the gains from trade? Perhaps surprisingly, the answer is no. Better information on the selling side worsens the "buyer's curse," thus...</p>

August 1997 <p> The standard decision theories of Savage and of Anscombe and Aumann both postulate that the domain of consequences is state independent. But this hypothesis makes no sense when, for instance, there is a risk of death or serious injury. The paper considers one possible way of...</p>

December 26, 1996

November 5, 1997 <p> This paper presents a micro-level historical and theoretical analysis of Genoa's economic and political history during the twelfth and thirteenth century by examining the factors influencing the extent to which its political system was self-enforcing and their change over time....</p>

We identify two sufficient conditions for games with strategic complementarities to have a unique equilibrium that is "strongly coalition-proof," that is, immune to incentive-compatible deviations by coalitions. If a Nash equilibrium is unique, then it is strongly coalition-proof. Also, if each...

February 2003 <p> Recently, economists have developed methods for structural estimation of auction models. Many researchers object to these methods because they find the rationality assumptions used in these models to be implausible. In this paper, we explore whether structural auction models can...</p>