We consider repeated interaction among several producers of a homogeneous, divisible good, traded at a common market. Demand is uncertain, and its law is unknown.

A class of non-cooperative constrained games is analysed for which the Ky Fan fuction is convex-concave. Nash equilibria of such games correspond to diagonal saddle points of the said function. This feature is exploited in designing computational algorithms for finding such equilibria.

We consider a two-period, one-good financial market, featuring variance-averse investors. Under fairly weak assumptions, like those imposed in the capital asset pricing model, we demonstrate how equilibrium may be approached and computed. As main argument we use the two-dimensionality of pricing...

Introduction: Decision making under uncertainty can often be formalized as a stochastic program, constrained not merely in material terms, but also by limited information. The former type of constraints, accounting for material bound, is usually described by inequalities required to hold almost...

We consider financial contracts that are tradable in any quantities at fixed prices. A bundle of such contracts constitutes an arbitrage if it offers non-negative payoff in any future state, but commands negative present cost. This article brings together fairly recent results on how to find an...

We explore optimal search for individual improvement when agents start with different confidence in own ability. The initial self-confidence may be determined by nature or socio-economic factors.

The paper analyses cooperative games with side payments. Each player facesa possibly non-convex optimization problem, interpreted as production planning, constrained by his resources or technology. Coalitions can aggreagate members' contributions. We discuss instances where such aggregation...

So-called potential functions are important, prominent, and common to many diverses fields, including optimization, dynamic processes, and physics. Monderer and Shapley have recently added a class of noncooperative games to that list. We extend their notion and consider repeated play of games...

Prime objects of this note are (I) excess demand generated by price-taking economic agents, and (II) an alternative version of tatonnement. We relate laws of demand, axioms of revealed preferences, and other notions of generalized monotonicity to evolutionary stable prices. Focus is on local...

A standard approach to duality in stochastic optimization problems with constraints in L(infinite) relies upon the Yosida-Hewitt theorem. We develop an alternative technique which employs only "elementary" means. The technique is based on an e-regularization of the original problem and on...