trust game experiment. In the experiments we inform donors about the beliefs of their respective recipients, while eliciting …-order beliefs is close to zero in all three experiments. …Guilt averse individuals experience a utility loss if they believe they let someone down. In particular, generosity …

(outgroup treatment). Dictators condition their amount sent on second-order beliefs. I find that, the positive influence of … second-order beliefs on how much the dictator sends is stronger in the ingroup treatment than in the outgroup treatment. From …

trust game experiment. In the experiments we inform donors about the beliefs of their respective recipients, while eliciting …-order beliefs is close to zero in all three experiments. …Guilt averse individuals experience a utility loss if they believe they let someone down. In particular, generosity …

emotions to belief-dependant models in economics. We find that - in addition to the positive effect of second-order beliefs and …

beliefs and actions into the utility function. We test the robustness of two types of intentions-based models (guilt aversion … and reciprocity). In addition to incentivised elicitation of first- and second-order action beliefs, we assess … intentions-based models. Both second-order beliefs and the weighting factor that depends on a participant's sensitivity to guilt …

theory on moral emotions to belief-dependant models in economics. We find that - in addition to second-order beliefs and …

, we test the relevance of their input variables (second-order beliefs and general dispositions for guilt/reciprocity). The … data confirm the predictions of belief-dependant models. Both second-order beliefs and a participant's sensitivity to guilt …/reciprocity are relevant for the decisions taken. Second-order beliefs appear to have an inverse U-shaped effect on the extent of kind …

provides the most suitable design for studying altruism and generosity in the lab setting, we use a modi.ed version to study … the beliefs involved in the game. Our results are substantial: men and women are expected to behave di¤er- ently. Moreover …

altruism and generosity in the lab setting, we use a modified version to study the beliefs involved in the game. Our results …

's counterfactual generosity intention. For a given pair of proposer candidates each states, via the strategy vector method, an intended … that counterfactual intentions of others often affect own generosity via substantial and significant average adjustments to …