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Bağımsız Denetimde Analitik İn...
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for example
2
Greenberg works in an extensive-form context
1
I will suggest than an institutionally efficient central bank cannot but act as an agent of communicative empowerment of the audiences that make up its local context of operation
1
Kreps and Levine (1987)
1
Political economists have traditionally been indifferent to the communicative construction of money and central banking in the public sphere. It does not matter to them whether monetary affairs are rendered as a rational game over the preservation of the value of the currency or
1
Rubinstein and Wolinksy consider strategic-form games and general "signal fictions". We should make clear from the outset that
1
a key issue is what sort of prior itiormation about payoffs should be considered. It is well known that predictions based on common certainty of payoffs are not robust to even a small amount of uncertainty. Following Fudenberg
1
although this paper is motivated by the learning-theoretic approach to equilibrium in games
1
and players observe only the outcomes in their own matches
1
and that this difference corresponds to the distinction between SCE and RSCE.8 Papers by Rubinstein and Wolinksy [1994] and Greenberg [1994]
1
and why they face no tradeoff between institutional efficiency and democratic legitimacy. In particular
1
are based on the idea that players form their forecasts of opponents play using prior information both about the opponents' payoffs and about the realized outcomes when the game is played. Both these papers
1
as a morality play. In this paper I will suggest that the very political economy of central bank independence requires a departure from such a practice. I will argue that the communicative articulation of the monetary game is relevant to understand how independent central banks can achieve institutional efficiency
1
as it is not in most experiments
1
both in the real world and in the laboratory
1
but it is consistent with an (approximate
1
but may be mistaken about the way that opponents would respond to deviations. Intuitively
1
but we have not checked the details
1
by the last few rounds of the experiment the first movers had stopped contributing
1
consider common certainty of rationality
1
each player correctly forecasts the actions that opponents will take along the equilibrium path
1
each time the game is played
1
heterogeneous) SCE (Fudenberg and Levine [1996] 7 ). Thus these experiments provide evidence that information about other players' payoffs makes a difference
1
in addition to almost common certainty of the payoffs
1
in section 4 we show that it does correspond to assuming almost common certainty of payoffs and independence. To capture the idea of SCE
1
incorporating restrictions on the priors into the steady-state learning model of Fudenberg and Levine [1993 b]
1
independence is discussed fi.u-ther in section 6.) Combining these assumptions lead to rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium
1
it (like Nash equilibrium) corresponds to a situation in which players have no prior information about the payoff fimctions of their opponents.4 This may be a good approximation of some real-world situations
1
it is also the obvious way to model play in game theory experiments in which subjects are given no itiormation about opponents' payoffs. In other cases
1
it seems plausible that players do have some prior information about their opponents' payoffs. The goal of this paper is to develop a more restrictive version of SCE that incorporates the effects of such prior information. In carrying out this program
1
like ours
1
namely that play corresponds to the steady state of a learning process in which the path is observed each time the game is played
1
one for each player role in the game. The observations of different agents in the same player role may differ depending on the actions they take. If itiormation about the aggregate distribution of outcomes is not available to the subjects
1
or "RSCE." If we think of equilibrium as describing the steady state of a random- matching process of the sort used in most game theory experiments
1
players do not use the prior payoff iniiormation to restrict their beliefs about the play of opponents who have already been observed to deviate from expected play. Intuitively
1
players observe only the actions played by their opponents (as opposed to the complete specification of the opponents' strategies) so that they need never receive evidence that their forecasts of off-path play are incorrect. 3 Because self- confirming equilibrium (henceforth "SCE") allows beliefs about off-path play to be completely arbitrary
1
players were informed of the fimction determining opponents' monetary payoffs. Here
1
ract: In a self-confirming equilibrium
1
so that the signal refers only to the deviator's payoffs. We discuss the issue of independence in section 6.) We verify in section 3 that this intuition is correct and that this concept is robust
1
subjects were not given any irdlormation about the payoffs of their opponents. In this treatment even in the later rounds of the experiment many first movers contributed to the public good. This is not consistent with RSCE
1
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Dekel, Eddie
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Tognato, Carlo
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ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution (ELSE), Department of Economics
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Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium
Dekel, Eddie
;
Fudenberg, Drew
;
Levine, David K.
-
ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005636460
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2
Institutional Efficiency in Independent Central Banking: A Communicative Matter?
Tognato, Carlo
-
Banco de la Republica de Colombia
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005274520
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