In this paper we present a new approach to evaluate the environmental efficiency of decision making units. We propose a model that describes a two-stage process consisting of a production and an end-of-pipe abatement stage with the environmental efficiency being determined by the efficiency of...

Researchers have utilized the fact that many states have term limits (as opposed to being eligible for re-election) for governors to determine how changes in electoral incentives alter state regulatory agency behavior. This paper asks whether these impacts spill over into private sector...

The paper reviews urban transport policies in Italian cities and their impact on the concentration of NO2 and PM10. Using parametric and non-parametric techniques, it finds no significant effect of the policy actions currently implemented. Further, it finds evidence of a weak positive impact of...

Researchers have utilized the fact that many states have term limits (as opposed to being eligible for re-election) for governors to determine how changes in electoral incentives alter state regulatory agency behavior. This paper asks whether these impacts spill over into private sector...

The paper reviews urban transport policies in Italian cities and their impact on the concentration of NO2 and PM10. Using parametric and non-parametric techniques, it finds no significant effect of the policy actions currently implemented. Further, it finds evidence of a weak positive impact of...

In this paper, we study a firm's optimal lobby behavior and its effect on investment in pollution abatement capital. We develop a dynamic framework where a representative firm can invest in both abatement and lobby capital in response to a possible future increase in pollution tax. We show that...

In this paper, we study a firm’s optimal lobby behavior and its effect on investment in pollution abatement capital. We develop a dynamic framework where a representative firm can invest in both abatement and lobby capital in response to a possible future increase in pollution tax. We show...

In this paper we argue that ambiguity, combined with social opinion formation, can be used as the foundation of a game-theoretic equilibrium concept that transcends the standard Nash equilibrium concept, applied to a model of the tragedy of the commons. Our approach sheds light on the...

In this paper, we study a firm's optimal lobby behavior and its effect on investment in pollution abatement capital. We develop a dynamic framework where a representative firm can invest in both abatement and lobby capital in response to a possible future increase in pollution tax. We show that...

We develop an econometric model for firm exit, using stochastic dynamic programming (SDP) as a starting point. According to SDP, the value of an operating firm can be written as the sum of (i) the net present value of continuing production if the firm is committed to a future exit date, and (ii)...