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A THEORY OF PREDICTABLE EXCESS RETURNS IN REAL ESTATE.
SPIEGEL, M.; STRANGE, W. - Graduate School of Business, Columbia University - 1989
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005776743
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Economic Growth and Integration in Central America
Schipke, Alfred; Desruelle, Dominique - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2007
How to entrench hard-won gains, increase resilience to shocks, and improve growth performance to reduce poverty? As Central America moves forward in regaining macroeconomic stability, these are the challenges. This study analyzes Central America’s real, fiscal, monetary, and financial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005590924
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Moral Hazard and Peer Monitoring in a Laboratory Microfinance Experiment
Cason, Timothy N.; Gangadharan, Lata; Maitra, Pushkar - Krannert School of Management, Purdue University - 2008
Most problems with formal sector credit lending to the poor in developing countries can be attributed to the lack of information and inadequate collateral. One common feature of successful credit mechanisms is group-lending, where the loan is advanced to an individual if he/she is a part of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005786822
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Moral Hazard and Limited Liability in the Market for Loans: Credit Restriction Versus Credit Rationing
Banerjee, Anindya; Besley, Timothy J. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1988
This paper develops a model of equilibrium in the market for loans. It focuses on the effects on equilibrium of (i …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792003
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Liability, insurance and the incentive to obtain information about risk
Bajtelsmit, Vickie; Thistle, Paul D. - In: The Geneva risk and insurance review 40 (2015) 2, pp. 171-193
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011382162
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Crowdfunding, demand uncertainty, and moral hazard : a mechanism design approach
Strausz, Roland - 2015
Crowdfunding challenges the traditional separation between finance and marketing. It creates economic value by reducing demand uncertainty, which enables a better screening of positive NPV projects. Entrepreneurial moral hazard threatens this effect. Using mechanism design, mechanisms are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011309652
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Tournaments with gaps
Imhof, Lorens; Kräkel, Matthias - 2013
performing agent must beat the second best to receive the winner prize. We analyze a tournament with two risk averse agents …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198511
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Understanding and managing behavioural risks : the case of food risks caused by malpractice in poultry production
Hirschauer, Norbert; Zwoll, Stefan - 2006
The probability that actors in economic relationships break rules increases with the profits they thus expect to earn. It decreases with the probability and level of short- and long-term losses resulting from disclosure. It also decreases with the level of social context factors and intrinsic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010346444
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On the political economy of financial deregulation
Ertürk, Korkut A. - 2016
promised higher profitability partly because of better risk management made possible by advances in information technology and …. Because systemic risk cannot be fully privatized social insurance against it is inevitably a common pool (or open) resource …, which means that there is an incentive for financial units to over-extract in the form of excessive risk taking in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011435704
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Leverage and risk taking
Moreno-Bromberg, Santiago; Roger, Guillaume - 2015
We study a dynamic contracting problem in which size is relevant. The agent may take on excessive risk to enhance short … curb risk taking. Firms that are less prone to risk taking can afford a higher leverage …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011506338