This paper offers a model in which there is direct competition between different groups. We deliberately endow an environment with many employers and workers in which opportunities are limited such that each employer is randomly matched with two workers from the entire worker population, which...

This paper explores ‘competitive equilibrium under uncertainty’ by Radner (1968). We provide a simple proof for the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium and characterize the maximal number of markets in the extended Arrow–Debreu economy.

This paper introduces a dynamic Bayesian game with an unknown population distribution. Players do not know the true population distribution and assess it based on their private observations using Bayes׳ rule. First, we show the existence and characterization of an equilibrium in which each...

This paper offers a model to study competition and corruption with a principal-agent framework. We provide two key results on the optimal institutional design. First, in quality-only competition, corruption does no harm to the principal, but in quality-price competition, corruption negatively...

Signaling, in regard to its role of information transmission, has been well understood by existing literature, but its e¢´ect on the decision to invest in content has not been thoroughly studied. This paper analyzes a model of pre-investment and subsequent costly signaling to reconsider the...

Economies that currently have the same productive capacity may implement different growth rates. This entails that it is insufficient to base international comparisons of welfare solely on current well-being, or introducing the potential for future growth in an arbitrary manner. NNP-based...