A model of sequential entry with Leontief costs is studied in which demand is iso-elastic. Some or all firms may hold excess capacity in the perfect equilibrium to the entry game. Firms with a first mover advantage trade off the positioning value of a large investment in capacity, leading to a...

A model of sequential entry with Leontief costs is studied in which demand is isoelastic. Some or all firms may hold excess capacity in the perfect equilibrium to the entry game. Firms with a first-mover advantage trade off the positioning value of a large investment in capacity, leading to a...

In this paper we establish a complete characterization of the strategic interaction of firms in sequential entry models. The limit price plays an important coordinating role in non-cooperative sequential entry models. We show that for many firms in a large range of sequential entry equilibria,...

It is shown that steady state Markov perfect equilibria of discrete time, infinite horizon, quadratic, adjustment cost games differ from equilibria of their infinitely repeated counterpart games with zero adjustment costs even though no adjustment costs are paid in the steady state. In contrast...

A puzzle in the analysis of trade policy is why free trade outcomes, which maximize world income, are not more often observed. One reason is that economics agents with special interests affect both the form and level of international protective policies. This paper investigates the dynamic...

This paper surveys the recent literature on strategic entry deterrence. Particular attention is paid to limit pricing, entry deterrence models using a two-stage framework, incomplete information treatments of entry deterrence and entry deterrence as a framework for modeling the determination of...

This paper examines market failure in a monopolistically competitive industry with differentiated products. The set of products sold and prices are compared between monopolistic competition and a social optimum. The industry is asymmetric as products differ in their objective characteristics....