This paper considers a two-stage quantity-setting duopoly model. The paper classifies demand functions into the following four cases in terms of the goods relevance and strategic relevance between both firms: ‘substitute goods and strategic substitutes’, ‘substitute goods and strategic...

This paper investigates a price-setting mixed model involving a private firm and a public firm to reassess the welfare effect of partial privatization. First, the government chooses the level of privatization to maximize social welfare. Second, observing the level of privatization, the firms...

This paper considers a two-production-period model in which a state-owned firm competes against a labour-managed firm. In the first production period, the state-owned and labour-managed firms simultaneously and independently choose outputs. The chosen outputs become common knowledge and then, in...

This paper considers mixed Cournot duopoly competition with two production periods in which labour-managed and profit-maximizing firms compete against each other. The paper demonstrates that there exists a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that coincides with the Stackelberg outcome in which the...

This paper considers lifetime employment contracts asa strategic commitment and examines the respectiveequilibrium outcomes of the two cases of a quantity-setting duopoly game with substitute goods and a quantity-setting duopoly game with complementary goods. First, in the quantity-setting game...

This paper investigates endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly consisting of a profit-maximising firm and a joint-stock firm. There are two stages and the firms simultaneously and independently announce in which stage they will offer lifetime employment as a strategic commitment. If both firms...

This paper examines two three-stage games with a labor-managed income-perworker- maximizing firm and a profit-maximizing firm. In the first stage, the labormanaged firm (resp. the profit-maximizing firm) decides whether to make a commitment to capacity. In the second stage, the other firm...

This paper examines international mixed competition, where one domestic social-surplus-maximizing public firm and one foreign profit-maximizing private firm can adopt a wage-rise contract as a strategic commitment. The paper considers the following three stages. In the first stage, the domestic...