We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyse an economy with several principals and agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterise the set of stable outcomes of this principal-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to...

We study the optimal intervention policy to stop projects in a relational contract between a principal and a policymaker. The policymaker is privately informed about his ability and privately chooses how much effort to exert. Before a project is completed, the principal receives a signal about...

We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyse an economy with several principals and agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterise the set of stable outcomes of this principal-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to...

We analyze corporate tax avoidance in a theoretical model and in a stylized experimental Bertrand setting in which symmetric firms and consumers sell and buy a homogeneous product, when human participants make decisions as firms and consumers. We investigate how market power and information...

Although the goal of licensing is to ensure the quality of services, it can also induce firms to operate informally or exit altogether. This paper examines licensing in the rental housing market by developing a model that indicates licensing's impact on the size of the underground rental market,...

We analyse corporate tax avoidance in a stylized experimental Bertrand setting withhomogenous products and symmetric firms and consumers. More specifically, we investigate how market size and information disclosure of firms’ tax avoidance behaviour could reduce corporate tax avoidance. We find...

We analyze corporate tax avoidance in a theoretical model and in a stylized experimental Bertrand setting in which symmetric firms and consumers sell and buy a homogeneous product, when human participants make decisions as firms and consumers. We investigate how market power and information...

This article argues that it is possible to distinguish between the utility of different institutional structures by comparing the quality service that each typed delivers. As the executive agencies of the new public management are considered to be different from the traditional public sector...

After several decades of improvement, water quality in the United States is getting worse, and the problem is primarily caused by run-off from non-point sources, such as farms and urban development. These non-point sources have never had regulatory mandates in the Clean Water Act, and have...

This Article provides the first extensive legal treatment of an important defense in the law of fraud and contracts: puffery. Legal authorities commonly say they make decisions about whether defendants should be able to utter exaggerated, optimistic, lies based on assumptions about buyer...