I demonstrate a straightforward but apparently widely unrecognized implication of the standard requirements for perfect competition: an economy in which consumers can choose to learn is generally not perfectly competitive. In particular, if endogenous welfare relevant learning is feasible, the...

With preference rigidities we find Pareto optima of an exchange economy, some of which involve unconsumed endowments. We show that such Pareto Optima can only be attained as market equilibria if there is a top dog in the initial endowment distribution who is richer than the other individuals....

We discover that letting agents pairwise sequentially exchange at "wrong" prices has a robust effect on prices at convergence. If the initial relative price for a good is cheaper than the equilibrium walrasian price due to initial endowments, the initial excess demand effect pushes resource...

This Article critique the role that the partial equilibrium trade-off paradigm plays in the debate over the definition of “consumer welfare” that courts should employ when developing and applying antitrust doctrine. The paper contends that common reliance on the paradigm distorts the debate...

This note argues that the competitive paradigm of neoclassical economics breaks down in the presence of constant returns to scale (CRS). With CRS, all goods can be produced at identical costs by all economic agents, making self-production a feasible alternative to market production. In the...

Recruiting agents, or "programs" costly screen "applicants" in matching processes, and congestion in a market increases with the number of applicants to be screened. To combat this externality that applicants impose on programs, application costs can be used as a Pigouvian tax. Higher costs...

I embed a electricity certificate system, mandating that a certain fraction of total electricity production must come from renewable sources, in a stylized competitive economy and derive a general equilibrium cost-benefit rule from perturbing the regulation. The welfare consequences (ignoring...

This paper studies the problem of accumulating heterogeneous capital goods in an economy with imperfect markets populated by boundedly rational agents. It relaxes classical assumptions about information and cognition. The agents are not capable of computing an equilibrium path to steady state....

This paper characterizes the out-of-equilibrium dynamics of a symmetric, pure exchange economy with two goods and N agents with uniformly distributed preferences and identical endowments. Relaxing the auctioneer assumption, but maintaining a global price rule, sequentially random pairwise...