We introduce a framework to analyze the interaction of boundedly rational heterogeneous agents repeatedly playing a participation game with negative feedback. We assume that agents use different behavioral rules prescribing how to play the game conditionally on the outcome of previous rounds. We...

We study the co-evolution of asset prices and individual wealth in a financial market with an arbitrary number of heterogeneous boundedly rational investors. Using wealth dynamics as a selection device we are able to characterize the long run market outcomes, i.e., asset returns and wealth...

In an economic geography model where both a negative pecuniary and a positive technological externality are present, we introduce an explicit dynamics of firms locational choice and we characterize its long run distribution. Our analysis shows that economic activities evenly distribute when the...

Using an analytically solvable general equilibrium model, we study how the distribution of economic activities is affected by the trade-off between pecuniary externalities, as dependent on transportation costs, and localized technological externalities, as dependent on inter-regional spillovers....

We study the co-evolution of asset prices and individual wealth in a financial market populated by an arbitrary number of heterogeneous boundedly rational investors. Using wealth dynamics as a selection device we are able to characterize the long run market outcomes, i.e. asset returns and...

In this paper we study the properties of an asset pricing model where boundedly rational agents respond to incoming news about economic fundamentals such as future dividends. Our aim is to characterize the resulting fluctuations of the market price around the time-varying underlying fundamental...

We study participation games with negative feedback, i.e. games where players choose either to participate in a certain project or not and where the payoff for participating decreases in the number of participating players. We use the replicator dynamics to model the competition between...