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Endogenous Group Formation in Risk-Sharing Arrangements

Genicot, Garance; Ray, Debraj - 2002

may destabilize insurance arrangements among the larger group. We therefore consider self-enforcing risk … must itself employ some self-enforcing risk-sharing agreement. We observe that the stability of subgroups is inimical to …) bounded size, a result in sharp contrast to the individual-deviation problem, and that the degree of risk-sharing in a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014119773

Uncertainty in a Fisherey Management Game

Engwerda, Jacob C. - 2005

In this paper, we analyze the consequences of taking noise into account in a simple two person fishery management game. Both a stochastic and deterministic formulation are considered. Compared to the noise-free model it is shown that the used stochastic framework has no implications for the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014065512

Incentivising trust

Lenton, Pamela; Mosley, Paul - In: Journal of Economic Psychology 32 (2011) 5, pp. 890-897

against risk. We work within the framework originally established by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) in which trust is … strengthens the first player’s risk efficacy, or ratio of assets to risk. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010577287

Productive Development Policies in Costa Rica: Market Failures, Government Failures, and Policy Outcomes

Monge-Gonzalez, Ricardo; Rivera, Luis; … - 2010

This paper analyzes five Productive Development Policies (PDPs) implemented in Costa Rica, finding that they are not optimally addressing market failures. Moreover, government failures rather than market failures represent the main justification for PDPs. Even in the presence of market failures,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010328255

The Polish Growth Miracle: Outcome of Persistent Reform Efforts

Lehmann, Hartmut - 2012

Since the beginning of transition in 1990 from a centrally planned to a market oriented economy, the performance of Poland's economy has been outstanding if we take GDP growth as our measure. It is not specific reforms that can explain this performance but the radical ("big bang") reforms at the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010331399

Who contributes? A strategic approach to a European immigration policy

Russo, Giuseppe; Senatore, Luigi - In: IZA Journal of Migration 2 (2013), pp. 1-16

Who pays for immigration control? According to the Lisbon Treaty the cost of enforcing the European border against illegal immigration shall be shared among the EU members. Nonetheless, the Treaty is vague with respect to the 'appropriate measures' to adopt in order to distribute the financial...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010331901

Lobbying against environmental regulation vs. lobbying for loopholes

Polk, Andreas; Schmutzler, Armin - 2003

We analyze the determinants of environmental policy when two firms engage in two types of lobbying against a restriction on allowed pollution: General lobbying increases the total amount of allowed pollution, which is beneficial for both firms. Private lobbying increases the individual pollution...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315572

The Polish growth miracle : outcome of persistent reform efforts

Lehmann, Hartmut - 2012

Since the beginning of transition in 1990 from a centrally planned to a market oriented economy, the performance of Poland’s economy has been outstanding if we take GDP growth as our measure. It is not specific reforms that can explain this performance but the radical (“big bang”) reforms...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009525223

Productive development policies in Costa Rica : market failures, government failures, and policy outcomes

Monge González, Ricardo; Rivera, Luis; … - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010247134

Who contributes? : a strategic approach to a European immigration policy

Russo, Giuseppe; Senatore, Luigi - In: IZA journal of migration : IZAJOM 2 (2013), pp. 1-16

Who pays for immigration control? According to the Lisbon Treaty the cost of enforcing the European border against illegal immigration shall be shared among the EU members. Nonetheless, the Treaty is vague with respect to the “appropriate measures” to adopt in order to distribute the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009786177