Why would a political elite voluntarily dilute its political power by extending the voting franchise? This paper develops a dynamic recursive framework for studying voter enfranchisement. We specify a class of dynamic games in which political rights evolve over time. Each period, private...

Do mandatory spending programs such as Medicare improve efficiency? We analyze a model with two parties allocating a fixed budget to a public good and private transfers each period over an infinite horizon. We compare two institutions that differ in whether public good spending is discretionary...

We prove existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in an infinite-horizon model of legislative policy making in which the policy outcome in one period determines the status quo for the next. We allow for a multidimensional policy space and arbitrary smooth stage utilities, and we assume...

This paper analyzes an ongoing bargaining situation in which i) preferences evolve overtime, ii) the interests of individuals are not perfectly aligned, and iii) the previous agreement becomes the next status quo and determines the payoffs until a new agreement is reached. We show that the...

This paper studies the Markov perfect equilibrium outcomes of a dynamic game of electoral competition between two policy-motivated parties. I model incumbent policy persistence: parties commit to implement a policy for their full tenure in office, and hence in any election only the opposition...

Models of repeated legislative bargaining typically assume an agenda setter is randomly selected each period, even if the previous period agenda setter successfully passed a proposal. In reality, successful legislative agenda setters (e.g., speakers, committee chairs) tend to hold onto power. We...

Based on the classic behavioural theory “the Theory of Planned Behaviour”, we develop an agent-based model to simulate the diffusion of smart metering technology in the electricity market. We simulate the emergent adoption of smart metering technology under different management strategies...

The finite horizon version of a popular legislative bargaining model due to Baron and Ferejohn is investigated. With three or more rounds of bargaining a continuum of distributions are supportable as subgame perfect equilibria in Markov strategies. Allowing for history dependent strategies...

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a fixed amount of a perfectly divisible resource among agents with single-dipped preferences. In this problem, it is known that any efficient and strategy-proof rule violates several fairness requirements. We alternatively propose a simple and natural...

Inclusive voting rules are rules that require the approval of a greater set of policy makers than a simple majority. Using a dynamic voting model with stochastic shocks, we identify a novel distortive effect of inclusive voting rules. Under inclusive voting rules, the identity of the pivotal...