This paper develops a general repeated game model over arbitrary time domain (which includes continuous time behaviour). A player is committed at any point in time to history independent behaviour for a positive length of time. The length of time of commitment depends on the way the history...

The issue of the connection between correlated equilibria of Maskin-Tirole (1987) economies and finite markovian stationary sunspot equilibria of overlapping generations economies is reconsidered in this paper.

Under not-too-stringent assumptions this study shows that there exists a generic extensive-form game having no "strategically stable" equilibrium. In addition, it is suggested that careless invocation of "common belief assumption" may be a potential source of inconsistent beliefs for players.

In this paper we consider the spatial model by Anderson and Neven (1991) to study the subgame perfect equilibria without restricting the consumers' reservation price. New equilibria emerge where firms locate at disperse points in space. Also, at equilibrium, firms may monopolize some segments of...