Money managers are rewarded for increasing the value of assets under management, and predominantly so in the mutual fund industry. This gives the manager an implicit incentive to exploit the well-documented positive fund-flows to relative-performance relationship by manipulating her risk...

Money managers are rewarded for increasing the value of assets under management, and predominantly so in the mutual fund industry. This gives the manager an implicit incentive to exploit the well-documented positive fund-flows to relative-performance relationship by manipulating her risk...

Money managers behave strategically when competing for fund flows within relatively small groups. We study strategic interaction between two risk-averse managers in continuous time, characterizing analytically their unique equilibrium dynamic investments. Driven by chasing and contrarian...

This article analyzes the dynamic portfolio choice implications of strategic interaction among money managers. The strategic interaction emerges as the managers compete for money flows displaying empirically documented convexities. A manager gets money flows increasing with performance, and...

This paper investigates the competition among portfolio managers as they attempt to outperform each other. We provide a tractable dynamic continuous-time model of competition between two risk-averse managers concerned about relative performance. To capture the managers’ asset specialization,...

Absent much theory, empirical works often rely on the following informal reasoning when looking for evidence of a mutual fund tournament: If there is a tournament, interim winners have incentives to decrease their portfolio volatility as they attempt to protect their lead, while interim losers...

Money managers are rewarded for increasing the value of assets under management, and predominantly so in the mutual fund industry. This gives the manager an implicit incentive to exploit the well-documented positive fund-flows to relative-performance relationship by manipulating her risk...

Two of the features that distinguish Social Security and many other state mandated pension plans around the world are that (i) a minimum level of savings for retirement is imposed on most citizens and (ii) individuals cannot decide how their contributions are invested. Here, a rationale for...

Asset owners (principals) typically do not manage their own investments and leave this job to delegated managers (agents). What is best for the asset owner, however, is usually not best for the fund manager. Additional agency conflicts arise when the asset owner does not know the quality and...

This paper develops a tractable dynamic model of competition between two risk-averse portfolio managers who attempt to outperform each other by trading in different stocks, reflecting asset specialization. We characterize explicitly the unique Nash equilibrium portfolio policies, and show that a...