Using a unique, hand-collected database of all venture-backed firms listed on Germany's Neuer Markt, we analyze the history of venture capital financing of these firms before the IPO and the behavior of venture capitalists at the IPO. We can detect significant differences in the behavior and...

When a young entrepreneurial firm matures, it is often necessary to replace the founding entrepreneur by a professional manager. This replacement decision can be affected by the private benefits of control enjoyed by the entrepreneur which gives rise to a conflict of interest between the...

We explore why venture capital funds limit the amount of capital they raise and do not reinvest the proceeds. This structure is puzzling because it leads to a succession of several funds financing each new venture which multiplies the well known agency problems. We argue that an inside investor...

Investments in new ventures involve financial contracts between an entrepreneur and outside investors. Investors, such as venture capital firms, represent well-diversified investors. In contrast, the entrepreneur must commit a substantial fraction of human and financial capital to the venture....

The existing literature on cluster embeddedness largely neglects the impact of finance on the development of firms' network linkages. This is striking in so far that particularly venture capital is often referred to as "smart money" providing firms not only with funds but also with network...

This paper proposes a simple partial equilibrium model to investigate the effects of government policy on venture capital backed investments. Giving up an alternative career, entrepreneurs focus their effort on a single, high risk venture each. Venture capitalists acquire an equity stake and...

The paper studies the effects of tax policy on venture capital activity. Entrepreneurs pursue a single high risk project each but have no own resources. Financiers provide equity finance. They must structure the entrepreneur's profit share and base salary to assure their incentives for full...

This paper surveys empirical and theoretical studies of various control mechanisms embedded in venture capital contracts. These mechanisms mitigate incentive problems and opportunistic behavior arising in the uncertain environment of financing young hightechnology enterprises that predominantly...

This paper examines the impact of venture capitalists' reputation building and experience accumulation on the genesis of venture capital markets. Venture capitalists must accumulate experience to successfully support high-technology enterprises. They must build reputation, i.e., a track record...

This paper analyses the impact of public equity schemes on venture capitalist's incentives to finance start-up enterprises and to support the management teams. In a double-sided moral hazard model, it is shown that experienced venture capitalists, who have already financed start-up enterprises,...