In a a two period model of strategic entry deterrence (a la Dixit, 1980) where the incumbent firm moves before the entrant by installing capacity for production, in a (perfect) equilibrium excess capacity is not observed under a deterministic demand. The question whether this result remains...

We examine takeover strategies for a multiproduct firm operating in a horizontally differentiated market. We show why a strategic scheme for taking over competitors should obey a maximal market share connection principle. When trying to reinforce its market power, a multiproduct firm should try...

Consumers' increased willingness to pay a price premium for greener products stimulates firms to compete in environmental regulations. This paper uses a model of vertical product differentiation to study how an emission tax affects environmental quality competition, aggregate emissions, and...

This Paper investigates how the formation of larger buyers affects a supplier's profits and, by doing so, his incentives to undertake non-contractible activities. We first identify two channels of buyer power, which allows larger buyers to obtain discounts. We subsequently examine the effects of...

Licensing in a patent thicket allows firms to either avoid or resolve hold-up. Firms’ R&D incentives depend on whether they license ex ante or ex post. We develop a model of a patent portfolio race, which allows for endogenous R&D efforts, to study firms’ choice between ex ante and ex post...

This paper studies the price dynamics induced by strategic firm behaviour in the presence of consumer learning about the uncertain quality differential of the products offered by a duopoly. It is found that consumers learn slowly and also that prices converge slowly to full-information levels. A...

This Paper examines competition between a dominant network and a challenging network with third-degree or perfect price-discrimination, allowing for arbitrary configurations of network externalities, as well as horizontal and vertical product differentiation. Domination in the coordination game...