In a world where firms are oligopolists, is it possible to create a customs union that raises the welfare of member countries without hurting non-members countries? We give sufficient conditions for an affirmative answer.

We derive the characteristics of firm-specific trade policies when industries consist of heterogeneous firms, and show how the informational requirements for policy design are thereby expanded. A consideration of these informational requirements indicates that governments will confront...

Marshallian districts are locales that accomodate a large number of small firms producing similar goods to be exported and benefit from the accumulation of know-how associated with workers residing there. We study the making of such districts by assuming that the cost function of a firm is a...

This paper examines the stability of research joint venture when the success of innovative activities is uncertain. While an increase in the likelihood of making a discovery provides firms with an incentive to cooperate, there is a competing incentive to conduct R&D independently. Should the RJV...

A model of location choice by Cournot oligopolists is presented, under the assumption that R&D spillovers depend on the distance between firms. We show that a variety of patters emerge. Agglomeration is optimal under certain assumptions. Geographical dispersion in a two- dimensional plane is...

In this paper the reaction of firms to the introduction of environmental charges in a given industry is analysed. Firms may decide either to relocate their plants abroad or to adopt a new environmental-friendly technology. The latter can be either developed by investing in R&D or obtained by...

This paper shows that if domestic firms do not have identical unit costs, then the interplay between the Herfindahl index of concentration and the elasticity of the slope of the demand curve is of major importance in the determination of optimal trade policies. When the demand curve is concave,...

We analyze a model of lobbying by oligopolists who allocate entrepreneurial time between lobbying and internal control (monitoring). We seek answers to the following questions: (i) if firms differ woth recpect to comparative advantage in lobbying, what is the equilibrium allocation of time...

The main objective of this paper is to propose a model to discuss some aspects of the interaction between the environmental and trade policies. The analysis is conducted both for the socially optimal policies and the policies that would emerge from majority voting. Finally the arguments are...