This paper revisits, in an environmental context, the vertical restraints literature as developed by Bonanno and Vickers (1988), Gal-Or (1991), Lin (1988) or Nakache and Soubeyran (1998) in an oligopolistic and deterministic situation. This literature considers constant returns to scale at the...

We analyze a model of strategic trade policies in the presence of international cross ownership of firms that are heterogeneous both in terms of costs and in terms of extent of foreign ownership. The equilibrium pattern of taxes and subsidies is characterized for any arbitrary cross ownership...

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the effect of upstream cost asymmetries on the behavior of integrated firms. The model highlights the respective roles of strategic considerations and of cost considerations in the determination of an integrated firm's interaction with the non integrated...

This paper studies the optimal production subsidies for domestic firms that compete in an export market against each other as well as against foreign rivals. Assuming that all firms do not have identical cost curves, it shows that the optimal policy for the home government is to give the more...

We show that under Bertrand competition, firms may have an incentive to transfer real ressources to a joint venture operating in an unrelated market. The optimal transfers are typically asymmetric, in order to reduce the extent of rivalry in the oligopoly.

Do we have to favor labor managed firms? What are the consequences? We examine the main models of the litterature to better understand the limits of this kind of organisation and to show when the financial constraints can help labor managed firms.

Le modele est constitue d'un tournoi entre deux employes d'une organisation hierarchique. Ces deux employes, initialement dans le meme poste, sont places en competition et celui qui realise le niveau de production le plus eleve obtient une promotion dans un poste, appele poste superieur. Les...

This paper analyzes a class of two-stage Cournot games where firms are collusive in the first stage, and shows that oligopolists may have a strong incentive to redistribute resources (such as capital, pollution permits etc...) within the industry as a means of coordinating their output decision....

This paper considers a model of oligopolistic competition and locational choice that incorporates the notion of regional industrial systems. Firms play a non cooperative game where the strategy set of firms is given by a set of existing industrial districts. Each firm is distinguished by its...