We use the ten years of experience in inflation-targeting in New Zealand since 1989 to test whether monetary policy appears to conform to the simple rules that have been recommended for it in the literature. Of the inflation targeting central banks, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand has both the...

This essay offers an analysis of actual German and Swiss monetary policy that explains this gap between operation and performance. It shows that neither country's central bank can be called a monetary targeter, according to a strict, formal definition of targeting, and it argues that the...

The aim of the present analysis is to shed light on the question whether Central Banks should publish their macroeconomic forecasts, and what could possibly be gained in monetary policy if they did so. We show that disclosing the Central Bank's assessment of the prevailing inflationary pressures...

It is argued that the history of the Australian Commonwealth Notes Issue Board over the period 1920-1924 is supportive of Friedman's contention that the possibility of a genuinely independent monetary authority is illusory. The Board was created as a genuinely independent monetary authority....

In this paper we investigate central bank accountability by looking at the effect of transparency in a simple monetary policy game with an overriding mechanism. Monetary policy is transparent if there is little uncertainty about the central banker's preferences for inflation stabilization...

We define and study transparency, credibilitym and reputation in a model where the central bank's characteristics are unobservable to the private sector and are inferred from the policy outcome. A low-credibility bank optimally conducts a more inflationary policy than a high-credibility bank, in...

This paper discusses how price stability can be defined and how price stability can be maintained in practive. Some lessons for the Eurosystem are also considered.

We examine a central bank's endogenous choice of degree of control and degree of transparency, under both commitment and discretion. We argue that discretion is the more realistic assumption for the choice of control and that commitment is more realistic for the choice of transparency.

Policy rules that are consistent with inflation targeting are examined in a small macroeconometric model of the US economy. We compare the properties and outcomes of explicit "instrument rules" as well as "targeting rules". The latter, which imply implicit instrument rules, may be closer to...