As well as providing an analysis of how financial stability could be sustained through the appropriate targeting of policy instruments at debt gearing, this paper aims to provide an overview of the respective roles which governments and shareholders could assume in deterring financial...

There has been a remarkable rise in the transparency of monetary policy during the last two decades. This paper provides an overview of the ways in which central banks have been providing more information about their monetary policymaking. Furthermore, it reviews the theoretical literature on...

Many countries have undertaken central-bank independence reforms, but the years of implementation differ. What explains such differences in timing? This is of interest more broadly, as it sheds light on factors that matter for the speed at which economic reforms come about. We study a rich set...

This paper discusses central banks’ use of the interest rate as the instrument of monetary policy, in light of a reconsideration of macroeconomic theory induced by the financial crisis and Great Recession. Three main guiding principles for the future conduct of interest rate policy are...

If discretionary monetary policy implies an inflation bias, monetary unification boosts the accumulation of public debt. The additional debt accumulation is welfare reducing only if governments are sufficiently myopic. In the presence of myopic governments, debt ceilings play a useful role in...

This paper explores how decentralized, national fiscal policies interact with a common monetary policy in a monetary union. We show that fiscal policy plays a more important ro le in stabilizing country-specific shocks than with national monetary policies. Whereas monetary u nification with an...

This paper explores under what conditions a European Monetary Union (EMU) is an optimum currency area. The scope for an EMU increases with convergence of structural and fiscal policies, small money holdings, a conservative European Central Bank, and dependent national central banks. How national...

We show that, with benevolent policymakers and fiscal leadership, monetary unification reduces inflation, taxes and public spending. These disciplining effects of a monetary union, which rise with the number of fiscal players in the union, are likely to raise welfare. Joining an optimally...

This paper develops a theory of central bank accountability. Two aspects of accountability are considered. The first one is transparency of actual monetary policy, the second aspect is the question of who bears final responsibility for monetary policy. Monetary policy is transparent if there is...

In many developing and developed countries, government debt stabilization is an important policy issue. This paper models the strategic interaction between the monetary authorities who control monetization and the fiscal authorities who control primary fiscal deficits. Government debt dynamics...