Recent growth in fringe benefits is attributable to increases in both legally required and voluntarily provided benefits. Therefore, predictions based upon the conventional firm-level analysis, in which non-wage payments are assumed to be entirely exogenous, should be reexamined.

This paper establishes a B-core existence result for normal form TU games.

Recent growth in fringe benefits is attributable to increases in both legally required and voluntarily provided benefits. Therefore, predictions based upon the conventional firm-level analysis, in which non-wage payments are assumed to be entirely exogenous, should be reexamined.

This paper uses Japanese prefectural panel data to analyze how income distribution affects economic growth. In the fixed effects and the GMM estimations, the income share of the third quintile has positive and statistically significant effects on five-year economic growth rates. On the other...

This paper provides an introduction to the field of evolutionary economics with emphasis on the evolutionary theory of household behavior. It shows that the goal of evolutionary economics is to improve upon neoclassical economics by incorporating more realistic and empirically grounded...

Martin Stuart ("Marty") Feldstein, currently George F. Baker Professor of Economics at Harvard University and President Emeritus of the National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. (NBER), is a renowned American economist who has made important contributions to public finance, macroeconomics,...

We analyze a rationale for official authorization of patient dumping in the prospective payment policy framework. We show that when the insurer designs the healthcare payment policy to let hospitals dump high-cost patients, there is a trade-off between the disutility of dumped patients (changes...

We extend the well-known spatial competition model (d'Aspremont et al., 1979) to a continuous time model in which two firms compete in each instance. Our focus is on the entry timing decisions of firms and their optimal locations. We demonstrate that the leader has an incentive to locate closer...

In most firms, if not all, workers are divided asymmetrically in terms of authority and responsibility. In this paper, we view the asymmetric allocations of authority and responsibility as essential features of hierarchy and examine why hierarchies often prevail in organizations from that...

We study deterministic voting mechanisms by considering an ordinal notion of Bayesian incentive compatibility (OBIC). If the beliefs of agents are independent and generic, we show that any OBIC mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible under an additional mild requirement. Our result...