Information asymmetry is a necessary prerequisite for testing adverse selection. This paper applies this sequence of tests to Mauritian slave auctions. The theory of dynamic auctions with private and common values suggests that when an informed participant is known to be active, uninformed...

This paper studies the informational content of elective teams in a dynamic principal/multiple-agents framework with adverse selection. Two agents with different employment histories are paid their conditional expected marginal product. They observe their types (good or bad), and choose between...

We ask whether young agents prefer to work in different-age or same-age production pairs in an overlapping-generations model where wages are reputation-based. We find that inter-generational teams (i) produce more heterogeneity in the old workers' reputations, (ii) generate a greater share of...

This paper develops a two-sector, general equilibrium, overlapping generations model to study necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of private tutoring, when education is publicly provided. Young agents have heterogeneous endowments of human capital, which they can augment...