If countries anticipate Bertrand competition in tax rates, they may expend effort that makes some of their tax payers less mobile or increases the mobility of tax payers elsewhere. I provide piecemeal evidence on what activities countries use. I analyse how such activities interact with Bertrand...

If countries anticipate Bertrand competition in tax rates, they may expend effort that makes some of their tax payers less mobile or increases the mobility of tax payers elsewhere. I provide piecemeal evidence on what activities countries use. I analyse how such activities interact with Bertrand...

If countries anticipate Bertrand competition in tax rates, they may expend effort that makes some of their tax payers less mobile or increases the mobility of tax payers elsewhere. I provide piecemeal evidence on what activities countries use. I analyse how such activities interact with Bertrand...

This study aims to analyze the locational drivers of FDI, with an emphasis on the role of market potential in MENA countries. Considering that the market does not necessarily comprise of the host economy but also trade opportunities in the region and in the rest of the world, this study...

We analyse the determinants of the regional disparity of FDI inflows to Russia. The spatial distribution of FDI is attributed to regional and/or trans-regional factors. Region specific characteristics such as wage, education level, transportation as well as gross regional product, which accounts...

This paper studies the effects of globalization on the ability of governments to generate tax revenues for the financing of national welfare states. In this context, it summarizes the theoretical predictions of various economic models of tax competition between countries and discusses the role...

A general version of the ZMW model of international tax competition is presented that confirms and extends the results of the existing literature about the choice of tax policy instruments in the symmetric case when the tax externality is positive for both countries. In the asymmetric case when...

This paper tackles the issue of international fiscal coordination in a world of integrated markets sovereign national governments. Taxation of mobile capital and immobile labor in order to finance a public good generates inefficient fiscal competition. Two fiscal reforms are considered: a...

This paper analyzes enhanced cooperation agreements in corporate taxation in a three country tax competition model where countries differ in size. We characterize equilibrium tax rates and the optimal tax responses due to the formation of an enhanced cooperation agreement. Conditions for...

This paper analyzes enhanced cooperation agreements in corporate taxation in a three country tax competition model where countries differ in size. We characterize equilibrium tax rates and the optimal tax responses due to the formation of an enhanced cooperation agreement. Conditions for...